Security

Daevix is built fail-closed. Egress from an enclave is default-deny at the network gateway: a request outside authored policy is refused at the data plane and the denial is audited — the denial is the feature. Key custody never crosses a boundary the data may not cross.

Operator authority is least-privilege by construction: there is no super-user. A platform operator can run the fleet but holds zero standing authority inside a customer org — reaching a customer’s management plane needs that customer’s approval, and reaching its sovereign data needs a grant the customer authored in its own enclave. Authorization on each plane is decided from that plane’s own grants; the enclave never asks the controlplane who may act. And access is reciprocally transparent — when anyone outside an org reads that org’s audit, the read lands in the org’s own audit, so the watched can always see the watcher.

The threat model, published here as-is from the repository, is the boundary-by-boundary source of truth for these guarantees.

• Threat model
• Key custody